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Abstract
In this paper, we revisit traditional checkpointing and rollback recovery strategies, with a focus
on silent data corruption errors. Contrarily to fail-stop failures, such latent errors cannot be detected
immediately, and a mechanism to detect them must be provided. We consider two models: (i) errors are
detected after some delays following a probability distribution (typically, an Exponential distribution); (ii)
errors are detected through some verification mechanism. In both cases, we compute the optimal period
in order to minimize the waste, i.e., the fraction of time where nodes do not perform useful computations.
In practice, only a fixed number of checkpoints can be kept in memory, and the first model may lead to
an irrecoverable failure. In this case, we compute the minimum period required for an acceptable risk.
For the second model, there is no risk of irrecoverable failure, owing to the verification mechanism, but
the corresponding overhead is included in the waste. Finally, both models are instantiated using realistic
scenarios and application/architecture parameters.
1 Introduction
For several decades, the High Performance Computing (HPC) community has been aiming at increasing the
computational capabilities of parallel and distributed platforms, in order to fulfill expectations arising from
many fields of research, such as chemistry, biology, medicine and aerospace. The core problem of delivering
more performance through ever larger systems is reliability, because of the number of parallel components.
Even if each independent component is quite reliable, the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is expected
to drop drastically when considering an exascale system [1]. Failures become a normal part of application
executions.
The de-facto general-purpose error recovery technique in high performance computing is checkpoint and
rollback recovery. Such protocols employ checkpoints to periodically save the state of a parallel application,
so that when an error strikes some process, the application can be restored into one of its former states.
There are several families of checkpointing protocols. We assume in this work that each checkpoint forms a
consistent recovery line, i.e., when an error is detected, we can rollback to the last checkpoint and resume
execution, after a downtime and a recovery time.
Most studies assume instantaneous error detection, and therefore apply to fail-stop failures, such as for
instance the crash of a resource. In this work, we revisit checkpoint protocols in the context of latent errors,
also called silent data corruption. In HPC, it has been shown recently that such errors are not unusual, and
must also be accounted for [2]. The cause may be for instance soft efforts in L1 cache, or double bit flips.
The problem is that the detection of a latent error is not immediate, because the error is identified only
when the corrupted data is activated. One must then account for the detection interval required to detect
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Figure 1: Error and detection latency.
the error in the error recovery protocol. Indeed, if the last checkpoint saved an already corrupted state, it
may not be possible to recover from the error. Hence the necessity to keep several checkpoints so that one
can rollback to the last correct state.
This work is motivated by a recent paper by Lu, Zheng and Chien [3], who introduce a multiple check-
pointing model to compute the optimal checkpointing period with error detection latency. More precisely,
Lu, Zheng and Chien [3] deal with the following problem: given errors whose inter arrival times Xe follow
an Exponential probability distribution of parameter λe, and given error detection times Xd that follow
an Exponential probability distribution of parameter λd, what is the optimal checkpointing period Topt in
order to minimize the total execution time? The problem is illustrated on Figure 1: the error is detected
after a (random) time Xd, and one has to rollback up to the last checkpoint that precedes the occurrence
of the error. Let k be the number of checkpoints that can be simultaneously kept in memory. Lu, Zheng
and Chien [3] derive a formula for the optimal checkpointing period Topt in the (simplified) case where k is
unbounded (k = ∞), and they propose some numerical simulations to explore the case where k is a fixed
constant.
The first major contribution of this paper is to correct the formula of [3] when k is unbounded, and to
provide an analytical approach when k is a fixed constant. The latter approach is a first-order approximation
but applies to any probability distribution of errors.
While it is very natural and interesting to consider the latency of error detection, the model of [3] suffers
from an important limitation: it is not clear how one can determine when the error has indeed occurred,
and hence to identify the last valid checkpoint, unless some verification system is enforced. Another major
contribution of this paper is to introduce a model coupling verification and checkpointing, and to analytically
determine the best balance between checkpoints and verifications so as to optimize platform throughput.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we revisit the multiple checkpointing model of [3] in
Section 2; we tackle both the case where all checkpoints are kept, and the case with at most k checkpoints.
In Section 3, we define and analyze a model coupling checkpoints and verifications. Then, we evaluate
the various models in Section 4, by instantiating the models with realistic parameters derived from future
exascale platforms. Related work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude and discuss future research
directions in Section 6.
2 Revisiting the multiple checkpointing model
In this section, we revisit the approach of [3]. We show that their analysis with unbounded memory is
incorrect and provide the exact solution (Section 2.1). We also extend their approach to deal with the case
where a given (constant) number of checkpoints can be simultaneously kept in memory (Section 2.2).
2.1 Unlimited checkpoint storage
Let C be the time needed for a checkpoint, R the time for recovery, and D the downtime. Although R and
C are a function of the size of the memory footprint of the process, D is a constant that represents the
unavoidable costs to rejuvenate a process after an error (e.g., stopping the failed process and restoring a
new one that will load the checkpoint image). We assume that errors can take place during checkpoint and
recovery but not during downtime (otherwise, the downtime could be considered part of the recovery).
Let µe =
1
λe
be the mean time between errors. With no error detection latency and no downtime, well-
known formulas for the optimal period (useful work plus checkpointing time that minimizes the execution
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time) are Topt ≈
√
2Cµe + C (as given by Young [4]) and Topt ≈
√
2C(µe +R) + C (as given by Daly [5]).
These formulas are first-order approximations and are valid only if C,R µe (in which case they collapse).
With error detection latency, things are more complicated, even with the assumption that one can track
the source of the error (and hence identify the last valid checkpoint). Indeed, the amount of rollback will
depend upon the sum Xe+Xd. For Exponential distributions of Xe and Xd, Lu, Zheng and Chien [3] derive
that Topt ≈
√
2C(µe + µd) + C, where µd =
1
λd
is the mean of error detection times. However, although
this result may seem intuitive, it is wrong, and we prove that the correct answer is Topt ≈
√
2Cµe +C, even
when accounting for the downtime: this first-order approximation is the same as Young’s formula. We give
an intuitive explanation after the proofs provided in Section 2.1.1. Then in Section 2.1.2, we extend this
result to arbitrary laws, but under the additional constraint that µd +D +R µe.
2.1.1 Exponential distributions
In this section, we assume that Xe and Xd follow Exponential distributions of mean µe and µd respectively.
Proposition 1. The expected time needed to successfully execute a work of size w followed by its checkpoint
is
E(T (w)) = eλeR (D + µe + µd) (eλe(w+C) − 1).
Proof. Let T (w) be the time needed for successfully executing a work of duration w. There are two cases:
(i) if there is no error during execution and checkpointing, then the time needed is exactly w + C; (ii) if
there is an error before successfully completing the work and its checkpoint, then some additional delays
are incurred. These delays come from three sources: the time spent computing by the processors before
the error occurs, the time spent before the error is detected, and the time spent for downtime and recovery.
Regardless, once a successful recovery has been completed, there still remain w units of work to execute.
Thus, we can write the following recursion:
E(T (w)) = e−λe(w+C)(w + C) + (1− e−λe(w+C)) (E(Tlost) + E(Xd) + E(Trec) + E(T (w))) . (1)
Here, Tlost denotes the amount of time spent by the processors before the first error, knowing that this
error occurs within the next w + C units of time. In other terms, it is the time that is wasted because
computation and checkpoint were not both completed before the error occurred. The random variable Xd
represents the time needed for error detection, and its expectation is E(Xd) = µd = 1λd . The last variable
Trec represents the amount of time needed by the system to perform a recovery. Equation (1) simplifies to:
E(T (w)) = w + C + (eλe(w+C) − 1)(E(Tlost) + µd + E(Trec)). (2)
We have
E(Tlost) =
∫ ∞
0
xP(X = x|X < w + C)dx
=
1
P(X < w + C)
∫ w+C
0
xλee
−λexdx,
and P(X < w + C) = 1− e−λe(w+C).
Integrating by parts, we derive that
E(Tlost) =
1
λe
− w + C
eλe(w+C) − 1 . (3)
Next, to compute E(Trec), we have a recursive equation quite similar to Equation (1) (remember that we
assumed that no error can take place during the downtime):
E(Trec) = e−λeR(D +R)
+(1− e−λeR)(E(Rlost) + E(Xd) +D + E(Trec)).
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Here, E(Rlost) is the expected amount of time lost to executing the recovery before an error happens,
knowing that this error occurs within the next R units of time. Replacing w + C by R in Equation (3), we
obtain
E(Rlost) =
1
λe
− R
eλeR − 1 .
The expression for E(Trec) simplifies to
E(Trec) = DeλeR + (eλeR − 1)(µe + µd). (4)
Plugging the values of E(Tlost) and E(Trec) into Equation (2) leads to the desired value.
Proposition 2. The optimal strategy to execute a work of size W is to divide it into n equal-size chunks,
each followed by a checkpoint, where n is equal either to max(1, bn∗c) or to dn∗e. The value of n∗ is uniquely
derived from y = λeWn∗ − 1, where L(y) = −e−λeC−1 (L, the Lambert function, defined as L(x)eL(x) = x).
The optimal strategy does not depend on the value of µd.
Proof. Using n chunks of size wi (with
∑n
i=1 wi = W ), by linearity of the expectation, we have E(T (W )) =
K
∑n
i=1(e
λe(wi+C) − 1) where K = eλeR (D + µe + µd) is a constant. By convexity, the sum is minimum
when all the wis are equal (to
W
n ). Now, E(T (W )) is a convex function of n, hence it admits a unique
minimum n∗ such that the derivative is zero:
eλe(
W
n∗ +C)(1− λeW
n∗
) = 1. (5)
Let y = λeWn∗ − 1, we have yey = −e−λeC−1, hence L(y) = −e−λeC−1. Then, since we need an integer
number of chunks, the optimal strategy is to split W into max(1, bn∗c) or dn∗e same-size chunks, whichever
leads to the smaller value. As stated, the value of y, hence of n∗, is independent of µd.
Proposition 3. A first-order approximation for the optimal checkpointing period (that minimizes total
execution time) is Topt ≈
√
2Cµe + C. This value is identical to Young’s formula, and does not depend on
the value of µd.
Proof. We use Proposition 2 and Taylor expansions when z = y + 1 = λeWn∗ is small: from ye
y = −e−λeC−1,
we derive (z − 1)ez = −e−λeC . We have (z − 1)ez ≈ z22 − 1, and −e−λeC ≈ −1 + λeC, hence z2 ≈ 2λeC.
The period is
Topt =
W
n∗
+ C =
z
λe
+ C ≈
√
2Cµe + C.
An intuitive explanation of the result is the following: error detection latency is paid for every error, and
can be viewed as an additional downtime, which has no impact on the optimal period.
2.1.2 Arbitrary distributions
Here we extend the previous result to arbitrary distribution laws for Xe and Xd (of mean µe and µd
respectively):
Proposition 4. When C  µe and µd + D + R  µe, a first-order approximation for the optimal check-
pointing period is Topt ≈
√
2Cµe + C.
Proof. Let Tbase be the base time of the application without any overhead due to resilience techniques. First,
assume a fault-free execution of the application: every period of length T , only Work = T −C units of work
are executed, hence the time Tff for a fault-free execution is Tff =
T
Work Tbase. Now, let Tfinal denote the
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expectation of the execution time with errors taken into account. In average, errors occur every µe time-
units, and for each of them we lose F time-units, so there are Tfinalµe errors during the execution. Hence we
derive that
Tfinal = Tff +
Tfinal
µe
F , (6)
which we rewrite as (
1−Waste)Tfinal = Tbase,
with Waste = 1− (1− F
µe
)(
1− C
T
)
. (7)
The waste is the fraction of time where nodes do not perform useful computations. Minimizing execution
time is equivalent to minimizing the waste. In Equation (7), we identify the two sources of overhead: (i)
the term Wasteff =
C
T , which is the waste due to checkpointing in a fault-free execution, by construction of
the algorithm; and (ii) the term Wastefail =
F
µe
, which is the waste due to errors striking during execution.
With these notations, we have
Waste = Wastefail + Wasteff −WastefailWasteff. (8)
There remains to determine the (expected) value of F . Assuming at most one error per period, we lose
F = T2 + µd + D + R per error: T2 for the average work lost before the error occurs, µd for detecting the
error, and D + R for downtime and recovery. Note that the assumption is valid only if µd + D + R  µe
and T  µe. Plugging back this value into Equation (8), we obtain
Waste(T ) =
T
2µe
+
C(1− D+R+µd
µe
)
T
+
D +R+ µd − C2
µe
(9)
which is minimal for
Topt =
√
2C(µe −D −R− µd) ≈
√
2Cµe. (10)
We point out that this approach based on the waste leads to a different approximation formula for the
optimal period, but Topt =
√
2C(µe −D −R− µd) ≈
√
2Cµe ≈
√
2Cµe + C up to second-order terms,
when µe is large in front of the other parameters, includig µd. For example, this approach does not allow us
to handle the case µd = µe; in such a case, the optimal period is known only for Exponential distributions,
and is independent of µd, as proven by Proposition 2.
To summarize, the exact value of the optimal period is only known for Exponential distributions and is
provided by Proposition 2, while Young’s formula can be used as a first-order approximation for any other
distributions. Indeed, the optimal period is a trade-off between the overhead due to checkpointing (CT ) and
the expected time lost per error ( T2µe plus some constant). Up to second-order terms, the waste is minimum
when both factors are equal, which leads to Young’s formula, and which remains valid regardless of error
detection latencies.
2.2 Saving only k checkpoints
Lu, Zheng and Chien [3] propose a set of simulations to assess the overhead induced when keeping only the
last k checkpoints (because of storage limitations). In the following, we derive an analytical approach to
numerically solve the problem. The main difficulty is that when error detection latency is too large, it is
impossible to recover from a valid checkpoint, and one must resume the execution from scratch. We consider
this scenario as an irrecoverable failure, and we aim at guaranteeing that the risk of irrecoverable failure
remains under a user-given threshold.
Assume that a job of total size W is partitioned into n chunks. What is the risk of irrecoverable failure
during the execution of one chunk of size Wn followed by its checkpoint? Let T =
W
n + C be the length of
the period. Intuitively, the longer the period, the smaller the probability that an error that has just been
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detected took place more than k periods ago, thereby leading to an irrecoverable failure because the last
valid checkpoint is not one of the k most recent ones.
Formally, there is an irrecoverable failure if: (i) there is an error detected during the period (probability
Pfail), and (ii) the sum of Tlost, the time elapsed since the last checkpoint, and of Xd, the error detection
latency, exceeds kT (probability Plat). The value of Pfail = P(Xe ≤ T ) is easy to compute from the error
distribution law. For instance with an Exponential law, Pfail = 1 − e−λeT . As for Plat, we use an upper
bound: Plat = P(Tlost + Xd ≥ kT ) ≤ P(T + Xd ≥ kT ) = P(Xd ≥ (k − 1)T ). The latter value is easy
to compute from the error distribution law. For instance with an Exponential law, Plat = e−λd(k−1)T . Of
course, if there is an error and the error detection latency does not exceed kT (probability (1-Plat)), we
have to restart execution and face the same risk as before. Therefore, the probability of irrecoverable failure
Pirrec can be recursively evaluated as Pirrec = Pfail(Plat + (1− Plat)Pirrec), hence Pirrec = PfailPlat1−Pfail(1−Plat) . Now
that we have computed Pirrec, the probability of irrecoverable failure for a single chunk, we can compute the
probability of irrecoverable failure for n chunks as Prisk = 1− (1−Pirrec)n. In full rigor, these expressions for
Pirrec and Prisk are valid only for Exponential distributions, because of the memoryless property, but they
are a good approximation for arbitrary laws. Given a prescribed risk threshold ε, solving numerically the
equation Prisk ≤ ε leads to a lower bound Tmin on T . Let Topt be the optimal period given in Theorem 3 for
an unbounded number of saved checkpoints. The best strategy is then to use the period max(Tmin, Topt) to
minimize the waste while enforcing a risk below threshold.
In case of irrecoverable failure, we have to resume execution from the very beginning. The number of
re-executions due to consecutive irrecoverable failures follows a geometric law of parameter 1−Prisk, so that
the expected number of executions until success is 11−Prisk . We refer to Section 4.1 for an example of how to
instantiate this model to compute the best period with a fixed number of checkpoints, under a prescribed
risk threshold.
3 Coupling verification and checkpointing
In this section, we move to a more realistic model where silent errors are detected only when some verification
mechanism (checksum, error correcting code, coherence tests, etc.) is executed. Our approach is agnostic
of the nature of this verification mechanism. We aim at solving the following optimization problem: given
the cost of checkpointing C, downtime D, recovery R, and verification V , what is the optimal strategy to
minimize the expected waste as a function of the mean time between errors µe? Depending upon the relative
costs of checkpointing and verifying, we may have more checkpoints than verifications, or the other way
round. In both cases, we target a periodic pattern that repeats over time.
Consider first the scenario where the cost of a checkpoint is smaller than the cost of a verification: then
the periodic pattern will include k checkpoints and 1 verification, where k is some parameter to determine.
Figure 2(a) provides an illustration with k = 5. We assume that the verification is directly followed by the
last checkpoint in the pattern, so as to save results just after they have been verified (and before they get
corrupted). In this scenario, the objective is to determine the value of k that leads to the minimum platform
waste. This problem is addressed in Section 3.1.
Because our approach is agnostic of the cost of the verification, we also envision scenarios where the
cost of a checkpoint is higher than the cost of a verification. In such a framework, the periodic pattern
will include k verifications and 1 checkpoint, where k is some parameter to determine. See Figure 2(b) for
an illustration with k = 5. Again, the objective is to determine the value of k that leads to the minimum
platform waste. This problem is addressed in Section 3.2.
We point out that combining verification and checkpointing guarantees that no irrecoverable failure will
kill the application: the last checkpoint of any period pattern is always correct, because a verification always
takes place right before this checkpoint is taken. If that verification reveals an error, we roll back until
reaching a correct verification point, maybe up to the end of the previous pattern, but never further back,
and re-execute the work. The amount of roll-back and re-execution depends upon the shape of the pattern,
and we show how to compute it in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.
6
Timew w w w w
V C C C C C V C
(a) 5 checkpoints for 1 verification
Timew w w w w
V C V V V V V C
(b) 5 verifications for 1 checkpoint
Figure 2: Periodic pattern.
3.1 With k checkpoints and 1 verification
We use the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 4 and compute a first-order approximation of the
waste (see Equations (7) and (8)). We compute the two sources of overhead: (i) Wasteff, the waste incurred
in a fault-free execution, by construction of the algorithm, and (ii) Wastefail, the waste due to errors striking
during execution.
Let S = kw+ kC + V be the length of the periodic pattern. We easily derive that Wasteff = kC+VS . As
for Wastefail, we still have Wastefail =
D+E(Tlost)
µe
. However, in this context, the time lost because of the
error depends upon the location of this error within the periodic pattern, so we compute averaged values as
follows. Recall (see Figure 2(a)) that checkpoint k is the one preceded by a verification. Here is the analysis
when an error is detected during the verification that takes place in the pattern:
• If the error took place in the (last) segment k: we recover from checkpoint k − 1, and verify it; we get
a correct result because the error took place later on. Then we re-execute the last piece of work and
redo the verification. The time that has been lost is Tlost(k) = R+V +w+V . (We assume that there
is at most one error per pattern.)
• If the error took place in segment i, 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1: we recover from checkpoint k − 1, verify it, get a
wrong result; we iterate, going back up to checkpoint i− 1, verify it, and get a correct result because
the error took place later on. Then we re-execute k−i+1 pieces of work and k−i checkpoints, together
with the last verification. We get Tlost(i) = (k − i+ 1)(R+ V + w) + (k − i)C + V .
• If the error took place in (first) segment 1: this is almost the same as above, except that the first
recovery at the beginning of the pattern need not be verified, because the verification was made just
before the corresponding checkpoint at the end of the previous pattern. We have the same formula
with i = 1 but with one fewer verification: Tlost(1) = k(R+ w) + (k − 1)(C + V ) + V .
Therefore, the formula for Wastefail writes
Wastefail =
D + 1
k
∑k
i=1 Tlost(i)
µe
, (11)
and (after some manipulation using a computer algebra system) the formula simplifies to
Wastefail =
1
2kµe
((R+V )k2+(2D+R+2V +S−2C)k+S−3V ) (12)
Using Wasteff =
kC+V
S and Equation (8), we compute the total waste and derive that Waste = aS+ b+
c
S ,
where a, b, and c are some constants. The optimal value of S is Sopt =
√
c
a , provided that this value is at
least kC + V . We point out that this formula only is a first-order approximation. We have assumed a single
error per pattern. We have also assumed that errors did not occur during checkpoints following verifications.
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Now, once we have found Waste(Sopt), the value of the waste obtained for the optimal period Sopt, we can
minimize this quantity as a function of k, and numerically derive the optimal value kopt that provides the
best value (and hence the best platform usage).
Due to lack of space, computational details are available in [6], which is a Maple sheet that we have
to instantiate the model. This Maple sheet is publicly available for users to experiment with their own
parameters. We provide two example scenarios to illustrate the model in Section 4.3.
Finally, note that in order to minimize the waste, one could do a binary search in order to find the last
checkpoint before the fault. Then we can upper-bound Tlost(i) by (k− i+1)w+log(k)(R+V )+(k− i)C+V ,
and Equation (12) becomes Wastefail =
1
2kµe
((R+ V )2k log(k) + (2D +R+ 2V + S− 2C)k + S− 3V ).
3.2 With k verifications and 1 checkpoint
We use a similar line of reasoning for this scenario and compute a first-order approximation of the waste
for the case with k verifications and 1 checkpoint per pattern. The length of the periodic pattern is now
S = kw+kV +C. As before, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let segment i denote the period of work before verification i, and
assume (see Figure 2(b)) that verification k is preceded by a checkpoint. The analysis is somewhat simpler
here.
If an error takes place in segment i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we detect the error during verification i, we recover from
the last checkpoint, and redo the first i segments and verifications: therefore Tlost(i) = R + i(V + w). The
formula for Wastefail is the same as in Equation (11) and (after some manipulation) we derive
Wastefail =
1
2µe
(
D +R+
k + 1
2k
(S− C)
)
. (13)
Using Wasteff =
kV+C
S and Equation (8), we proceed just as in Section 3.1 to compute the optimal value
Sopt of the periodic pattern, and then the optimal value kopt that minimizes the waste. Details are available
within the Maple sheet [6].
4 Evaluation
This section provides some examples for instantiating the various models. We aimed at choosing realistic
parameters in the context of future exascale platforms, but we had to restrict to a limited set of scenarios,
which do not intend to cover the whole spectrum of possible parameters. The Maple sheet [6] is available to
explore other scenarios.
4.1 Best period with k checkpoints under a given risk threshold
We first evaluate Prisk, the risk of irrecoverable failure, as defined in Section 2.2. Figures 3 and 4 present,
for different scenarios, the probability Prisk as a function of the checkpointing period T on the left. On the
right, the figures present the corresponding waste with k checkpoints and in the absence of irrecoverable
failures. This waste can be computed following the same reasoning as in Equation (9). For each figure,
the left diagram represents the risk implied by a given period T , showing the value Topt of the optimal
checkpoint interval (optimal with respect to waste minimization and in the absence of irrecoverable failures,
see Equation (10)) as a blue vertical line. The right diagram on the figure represents the corresponding
waste, highlighting the trade-off between an increased irrecoverable-failure-free waste and a reduced risk. As
stated in Section 2.2, it does not make sense to select a value for T lower than Topt, since the waste would
be increased, for an increased risk.
Figure 3 considers a machine consisting of 105 components, and a component MTBF of 100 years. This
component MTBF corresponds to the optimistic assumption on the reliability of computers made in the
literature [7, 1]. The platform MTBF µe is thus 100 × 365 × 24/100, 000 ≈ 8.76 hours. The times to
checkpoint and recover (10 min) correspond to reasonable mean values for systems at this size [8, 9]. At
this scale, process rejuvenation is small, and we set the downtime to 0s. For these average values to have a
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Figure 3: Risk of irrecoverable failure as a function of the checkpointing period, and corresponding waste.
(k = 3, λe=
105
100y
, λd = 30λe, w = 10d, C = R = 600s, and D = 0s.)
meaning, we consider a run that is long enough (10 days of work), and in order to illustrate the trade-off, we
take a rather low (but reasonable) value k = 3 of intervals, and a mean time error detection µd significantly
smaller (30 times) than the MTBF µe itself.
With these parameters, Topt is around 100 minutes, and the risk of irrecoverable failure at this checkpoint
interval can be evaluated at 1/2617 ≈ 38 · 10−5, inducing an irrecoverable-failure-free waste of 23.45%. To
reduce the risk to 10−4, a Tmin of 8000 seconds is sufficient, increasing the waste by only 0.6%. In this
case, the benefit of fixing the period to max(Topt, Tmin) is obvious. Naturally, keeping a bigger amount of
checkpoints (increasing k) would also reduce the risk, at constant waste, if memory can be afforded.
We also consider in Figure 4 a more optimistic scenario where the checkpointing technology and avail-
ability of resources is increased by a factor 10: the time to checkpoint, recover, and allocate new computing
resources is divided by 10 compared to the previous scenario. Other parameters are kept similar. One can
observe that Topt is largely reduced (down to less than 35 minutes between checkpoints), as well as the
optimal irrecoverable-failure-free waste (9.55%). This is unsurprising, and mostly due to the reduction of
failure-free waste implied by the reduction of checkpointing time. But because the period between check-
points becomes smaller, while the latency to detect an error is unchanged (µd is still 30 times smaller than
µe), the risk that an error happens at the interval i but is detected after interval i + k is increased. Thus,
the risk climbs to 1/2, an unacceptable value. To reduce the risk to 10−4 as previously, it becomes necessary
to consider a Tmin of 6650 seconds, which implies an irrecoverable-failure-free waste of 15%, significantly
higher than the optimal one, which is below 10%, but still much lower than the 24% when checkpoint and
availability costs are 10 times higher.
4.2 Periodic pattern with k verifications and 1 checkpoint
We now focus on the waste induced by the different ways of coupling periodic verification and checkpointing.
We first consider the case of a periodic pattern with more verifications than checkpoints: every k verifications
of the current state of the application, a checkpoint is taken. The duration of the work interval S, between two
verifications in this case, is optimized to minimize the waste. We consider two scenarios. For each scenario,
we represent two diagrams: the left diagram shows the waste as a function of k for a given verification cost
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Figure 4: Risk of irrecoverable failure as a function of the checkpointing period, and corresponding waste.
(k = 3, λe =
105
100y
, λd = 30λe, w = 10d, C = R = 60s, and D = 0s.)
V , and the right diagram shows the waste as a function of k and V using a 3D surface representation.
In the first scenario, we consider the same setup as above in Section 4.1. The waste is computed in its
general form, so we do not need to define the duration of the work. As represented in Figure 5, for a given
verification cost, the waste can be optimized by making more than one verifications. When k > 1, there
are intermediate verifications that can enable to detect an error before a periodic pattern (of length S) is
completed, hence, that can reduce the time lost due to an error. However, introducing too many verifications
induces an overhead that eventually dominates the waste. The 3D surface shows that the waste reduction
is significant when increasing the number of verifications, until the optimal number is reached. Then, the
waste starts to increase again slowly. Intuitively, the lower the cost for V , the higher the optimal value for k.
When considering the second scenario (Figure 6), with an improved checkpointing and availability setup,
the same conclusions can be reached, with an absolute value of the waste greatly diminished. Since forced
verifications allow to detect the occurrence of errors at a controllable rate (depending on S and k), the risk
of non-recoverable errors is nonexistent in this case, and the waste can be greatly diminished, with very few
checkpoints taken and kept during the execution.
4.3 Periodic pattern with k checkpoints and 1 verification
The last set of experiments considers the opposite case of periodic patterns: checkpoints are taken more
often than verifications. Every k checkpoints, a verification of the data consistency is done. Intuitively, this
could be useful if the cost of verification is large compared to the cost of checkpointing itself. In that case,
when rolling back after an error is discovered, each checkpoint that was not validated before is validated at
rollback time, potentially invalidating up to k − 1 checkpoints.
Because this pattern has potential only when the cost of checkpoint is much lower than the cost of
verification, we considered the case of a greatly improved checkpoint / availability setup: the checkpoint
and recovery times are only 6 seconds in Figure 7. One can observe that in this extreme case, it can still
make sense to consider multiple checkpoints between two verifications (when V = 100 seconds, a verification
is done only every 3 checkpoints optimally); however the 3D surface demonstrates that the waste is still
dominated by the cost of the verification, and little improvement can be achieved by taking the optimal
value for k. The cost of verification must be incurred when rolling back, and this shows on the overall
performance if the verification is costly.
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Figure 5: Case with k verifications, and one checkpoint per periodic pattern. Waste as function of k, and
potentially of V , using the optimal period. (V = 20s, C = R = 600s,D = 0s, and µ = 10y
105
.)
Figure 6: Case with k verifications, and one checkpoint per periodic pattern. Waste as function of k, and
potentially of V , using the optimal period. (V = 2s, C = R = 60s,D = 0s, and µ = 10y
105
.)
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Figure 7: Case with k checkpoints, and one verification per periodic pattern. Waste as function of k, and
potentially of V , using the optimal period. (V = 100s, C = R = 6s,D = 0s, and µ = 10y
105
.)
Figure 8: Case with k checkpoints, and one verification per periodic pattern. Waste as function of k, and
potentially of V , using the optimal period. (V = 300s, C = R = 60s,D = 0s, and µ = 10y
105
.)
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This is illustrated even more clearly with Figure 8, where the checkpoint costs and machine availability
are set to the second scenario of Sections 4.1 and 4.2. As soon as the checkpoint cost is not negligible
compared to the verification cost (only 5 times smaller in this case), it is more efficient to validate every
other checkpoint than to validate only after k > 2 checkpoints. The 3D surface shows that this holds true
for rather large values of V .
All the rollback / recovery techniques that we have evaluated above, using various parameters for the
different costs, and stressing the different approaches to their limits, expose a waste that remains, in the
vast majority of the cases, largely below 66%. This is noticeable, because the traditional hardware based
technique, which relies on triple modular redundancy and voting [10], mechanically presents a waste that is
at least equal to 66% (two-thirds of resources are wasted, and neglecting the cost of voting).
5 Related work
As already mentioned, this work is motivated by the recent paper by Lu, Zheng and Chien [3], who introduce
a multiple checkpointing model to compute the optimal checkpointing period with error detection latency.
We start with a brief overview of traditional checkpointing approaches before discussing error detection and
recovery mechanisms.
5.1 Checkpointing
Traditional (coordinated) checkpointing has been studied for many years. The major appeal of the coor-
dinated approach is its simplicity, because a parallel job using n processors of individual MTBF Mind can
be viewed as a single processor job with MTBF µ = Mindn . Given the value of µ, an approximation of the
optimal checkpointing period can be computed as a function of the key parameters (downtime D, checkpoint
time C, and recovery time R). The first estimate had been given by Young [4] and later refined by Daly [5].
Both use a first-order approximation for Exponential failure distributions; their derivation is similar to the
approach in Equations (6) and (7). More accurate formulas for Weibull failure distributions are provided
in [11, 12, 13]. The optimal checkpointing period is known only for Exponential failure distributions [8].
Dynamic programming heuristics for arbitrary distributions are proposed in [14, 15, 8].
The literature proposes different works [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] on the modeling of coordinated checkpointing
protocols. In particular, [17] and [16] focus on the usage of available resources: some may be kept as backup
in order to replace the down ones, and others may be even shutdown in order to decrease the failure risk or
to prevent storage consumption by saving fewer checkpoint snapshots.
The major drawback of coordinated checkpointing protocols is their lack of scalability at extreme-scale.
These protocols will lead to I/O congestion when too many processes are checkpointing at the same time.
Even worse, transferring the whole memory footprint of an HPC application onto stable storage may well
take so much time that a failure is likely to take place during the transfer! A few papers [20, 21] propose
a scalability study to assess the impact of a small MTBF (i.e., of a large number of processors). The mere
conclusion is that checkpoint time should be dramatically reduced for platform waste to become acceptable,
which motivated the instantiation of optimistic scenarios in Section 4.
All the above approaches maintain a single checkpoint. If the checkpoint file includes errors, the applica-
tion faces an irrecoverable failure and must restart from scratch. This is because error detection latency is
ignored in traditional rollback and recovery schemes. These schemes assume instantaneous error detection
(therefore mainly targeting fail-stop failures) and are unable to accommodate silent errors.
5.2 Error detection
Considerable efforts have been directed at error-checking to reveal latent errors. Most techniques combine
redundancy at various levels, together with a variety of verification mechanisms. The oldest and most drastic
approach is at the hardware level, where all computations are executed in triplicate, and majority voting is
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enforced in case of different results [10]. Error detection approaches include memory scrubbing [22], fault-
tolerant algorithms [23, 24, 25], ABFT techniques [26, 27] and critical MPI message validation [28]. We refer
to Lu, Zheng and Chien [3] for a comprehensive list of techniques and references. As already mentioned, our
work is agnostic of the underlying error-detection technique and takes the cost of verification as an input
parameter to the model (see Section 3).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit traditional checkpointing and rollback recovery strategies. Rather than considering
fail-stop failures, we focus on silent data corruption errors. Such latent errors cannot be neglected anymore in
High Performance Computing, in particular in sensitive and high precision simulations. The core difference
with fail-stop failures is that error detection is not immediate.
We discuss and analyze two models. In the first model, errors are detected after some delay following
a probability distribution (typically, an Exponential distribution). We compute the optimal checkpointing
period in order to minimize the waste when all checkpoints can be kept in memory, and we show that this
period does not depend on the distribution of detection times. In practice, only a few checkpoints can be
kept in memory, and hence it may happen that an error was detected after the last correct checkpoint was
removed from storage. We derive a minimum value of the period to guarantee, within a risk threshold, that
at least one valid checkpoint remains when a latent error is detected.
A more realistic model assumes that errors are detected through some verification mechanism. Periodi-
cally, one checks whether the current status is meaningful or not, and then eventually detects a latent error.
We discuss both the case where the periodic pattern includes k checkpoints for one verification (large cost of
verification), and the opposite case with k verifications for one checkpoint (inexpensive cost for verification).
We express a formula for the waste in both cases, and, from these formulas, we derive the optimal period.
The various models are instantiated with realistic parameters, and the evaluation results clearly corrob-
orate the theoretical analysis. For the first model, with detection times, the tradeoff between waste and
risk of irrecoverable error clearly appears, hence showing that a period larger than the one minimizing the
irrecoverable-failure-free waste should often be chosen to achieve an acceptable risk. The advantage of the
second model is that there are no irrecoverable failures (within each period, there is a verification followed
by a checkpoint, hence ensuring a valid checkpoint). We compute the optimal pattern of checkpoints and
verifications per period, as a function of their respective cost, to minimize the waste. The pattern with more
checkpoints than verification turns out to be usable only when the cost of checkpoint is much lower than
the cost of verification, and the conclusion is that it is often more efficient to verify the result every other
checkpoint.
Overall, we provide a thorough analysis of checkpointing models for latent errors, both analyzing the
models analytically, and evaluating them through different scenarios. A future research direction would be
to study more general scenarios of multiple checkpointing, for instance by keeping not the consecutive k
last checkpoints in the first model, but rather some older checkpoints to decrease the risk. In the second
model, more verification/checkpoint combinations could be studied, while we focused on cases with an integer
number of checkpoints per verification (or the converse).
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